RACF authorization
The authorization requirements differ among the R_admin functions.
For the functions which send requests to the RACF® subsystem address space (all of the input
functions, and password or password phrase envelope retrieval),
a user ID is passed to the RACF address
space where an ACEE is created under which to execute the RACF command. For the profile extract
functions, which run in the caller's address space, the actual ACEE,
if present, will be used for authority checking. If a user ID is provided,
an ACEE will be created for this purpose. Only a supervisor state
caller can directly specify the user ID or ACEE as a parameter to R_admin.
The following list shows the possible sources of the user ID or ACEE,
in the order in which they are searched:
- The RACF_userID parameter (supervisor state callers only)
- The ACEE_ptr parameter (supervisor state callers only)
- The user ID associated with the current task control block (TCB)
- The user ID associated with the current address space (ASXB)
Where appropriate, see the Authorization Required topic for the relevant RACF command, in the z/OS Security Server RACF Command Language Reference.
The following table summarizes the authorization required for the
function codes:
Function code | Problem state allowed? | Command authority enforced? | FACILITY class authorization |
---|---|---|---|
ADMN_RUN_COMD | Yes | Yes | For problem state callers only, READ access to IRR.RADMIN.command-name. The resource must be defined using the full command name even if the abbreviated version of the command name is used with R_Admin. (For example, 'LU JOEUSER' would require READ authority to IRR.RADMIN.LISTUSER.) |
Update function codes (X'01'-X'04' and X'06'- X'15') | No | Yes | N/A |
ADMN_XTR_RRSF | Yes | Yes, Authorization is determined by OPERCMDS resources subsystem-name.SET.LIST and subsystem-name.TARGET.LIST. | READ access to IRR.RADMIN.EXTRACT.RRSF With FACILITY authorization, the subsystem name, prefix, and user ID (with the TRUSTED and PRIVILEGED indicators) are always returned, even if OPERCMDS authorization is denied. |
ADMN_XTR_SETR | Yes | Yes (optionally for a supervisor state caller). The authorization rules of the SETROPTS LIST command are applied. | For problem state callers, and for supervisor state callers who request it, READ access to IRR.RADMIN.SETROPTS.LIST |
ADMN_UNL_SETR | No | No | N/A |
ADMN_XTR_PPENV | No | N/A | READ access to IRR.RADMIN.EXTRACT.PPENV (If this access check is being audited, the logstring will identify the user ID whose password phrase envelope was extracted.) |
ADMN_XTR_PWENV | No | N/A | READ access to IRR.RADMIN.EXTRACT.PWENV (If this access check is being audited, the logstring will identify the user ID whose password envelope was extracted.) |
Profile extract functions (X'19' - X'1D', X'1F', X'20', X'22'-X'23") | Yes | Yes. Each function code maps to a RACF listing command (For example, the authorization rules of the LISTGRP command). This authority can be skipped for a supervisor state caller if requested in the input parameter list. | For problem state callers and for supervisor state callers who request it:
|
Note:
- Generic FACILITY class profiles can be used.
- For the profile extract functions, it is possible that the caller
is only authorized to see a subset of the profile information. In
this case, only this subset of information is returned. If any information
is returned, the caller receives a 0 return code, and no indication
that information has been suppressed. Following are some situations
in which information is suppressed (for problem state callers, and
for supervisor state callers who have not requested that the command
authority checks be bypassed). These situations are identical
to the corresponding RACF command
(e.g. LISTUSER, LISTGRP, and RLIST).
- Only a user with the AUDITOR attribute (at either the group or system level) or the ROAUDIT attribute can view the UAUDIT setting of a USER profile, or the AUDITOR-related audit settings in a general resource profile.
- Users can be authorized to view the BASE segment, but no additional segments.
- With the use of field-level access checking (using the FIELD class), users can be authorized to view certain non-BASE segment information without having authority to view the BASE segment.
- When certain SECLABEL-related SETROPTS options are in effect, the installation data field of the USER profile is suppressed for all but system SPECIAL users.
- When a non-privileged user has at least READ, but not ALTER access to a general resource profile, the access list is not returned.
- For the SETROPTS extract function, it is possible that the caller is authorized to see only a subset of the SETROPTS information. In this case, only this subset of information is returned. If any information is returned, the caller receives a 0 return code, and no indication that information has been suppressed. For any caller who does not have the AUDITOR or ROAUDIT attribute, or the group-AUDITOR attribute in any of their groups, the auditing related fields are suppressed.