z/OS Cryptographic Services ICSF Application Programmer's Guide
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Usage Notes

z/OS Cryptographic Services ICSF Application Programmer's Guide
SA22-7522-16

The key forms are defined as follows:

Operational (OP)
The key value is enciphered under a master key. The result is placed into an internal key token. The key is then operational at the local system.
Importable (IM)
The key value is enciphered under an importer key-encrypting key. The result is placed into an external key token. The corresponding key_encrypting_key_identifier_x parameter must contain an AES IMPORTER key token or label.
Exportable (EX)
The key value is enciphered under an exporter key-encrypting key. The result is placed into an external key token. The corresponding key_encrypting_key_identifier_x parameter must contain an AES EXPORTER key token or label.

These tables list the valid key type and key form combinations.

Table 39. Key Generate2 valid key type and key form for one key
key_type_1Key Form OP, IM, EX
CIPHERX
MACX
Table 40. Key Generate2 Valid key type and key forms for two keys
key_type_1key_type_2Key Form OPOP, OPIM, IMIMKey Form OPEX, EXEX, IMEX
CIPHERCIPHERXX
MACMACXX
MACMACVERXX
MACVERMACXX
IMPORTEREXPORTERX
EXPORTERIMPORTERX

If an AES KEK is used, the strength of the KEK expected by Key Generate2 depends on the attributes of the key being generated. The resulting return code and reason code when using a KEK that is weaker depends on the “Variable-length Symmetric Token - disallow weak wrap" and “Variable-length Symmetric Token - warn when weak wrap" access control points:

  • If the “disallow" access control point is disabled (the default), the key strength requirement will not be enforced. Using a weaker key will result in return code 0 with a non-zero reason code if the “warn" access control point is enabled. Otherwise, a reason code of zero will be returned.
  • If the “disallow" access control point is enabled (using TKE), the key strength requirement will be enforced, and attempting to use a weaker key will result in return code 8.

For AES keys, the AES KEK must be at least as strong as the key being generated to be considered sufficient strength.

For HMAC keys, the AES KEK must be sufficient strength as described in the following table.

Table 41. AES KEK strength required for generating an HMAC key under an AES KEK
Key-usage field 2 in the HMAC key containsMinimum strength of AES KEK to adequately protect the HMAC key
SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512256 bits
SHA-224192 bits
SHA-1128 bits

The following table shows the access control points in the ICSF role that control the function of this service.

Table 42. Required access control points for Key Generate2
Access Control PointFunction control
Key Generate2 - OPKey Form OP, EX, IM
Key Generate2 - Key setKey Form OPOP, OPIM, IMIM, OPEX, EXEX, IMEX
Variable-length Symmetric Token - disallow weak wrapProhibit wrapping a key with a weaker key
Variable-length Symmetric Token - warn when weak wrapIssue a non-zero reason code when using a weak wrapping key

Note that both the “Variable-length Symmetric Token - disallow weak wrap" and “Variable-length Symmetric Token - warn when weak wrap" access control points are disabled in the default role.

This table lists the required cryptographic hardware for each server type and describes restrictions for this callable service.

Table 43. Key Generate2 required hardware
ServerRequired cryptographic hardwareRestrictions

IBM eServer zSeries 900

This service is not supported.
IBM eServer zSeries 990

IBM eServer zSeries 890

This service is not supported.
IBM System z9 EC

IBM System z9 BC

This service is not supported.
IBM System z10 EC

IBM System z10 BC

Crypto Express2 CoprocessorThis service is not supported.
Crypto Express3 CoprocessorThis service is not supported.
z196Crypto Express3 Coprocessor

AES key support require the Sep. 2011 or later licensed internal code (LIC).

HMAC key support requires the Nov. 2010 or later licensed internal code (LIC).

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