Thinking about cloud security? What about your SAN?
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Everyone is talking about cloud security these days. Is it clever to give my data outside my own data center? To another company? Maybe even outside the country? How safe and secure is that? Not only the way in between but also then there? Are they protected enough? Are they able to block intruders both remotely and locally? And what about attackers from within the cloud service provider? The discussion is so full of - indeed reasonable - concerns that I started to wonder.
Why do I often see SANs that are not secured at all?
I don't mean the physical access control to the machines themselves. Usually companies take that one seriously. But all the other aspects of SAN security are often disregarded according to my experience. If there is no statutory duty or the enforcement of compliance it's just a variable in the risk calculation about costs of security, probabilities and inexplicable consequences in case of security breaches. And taking also budget constraints and lack of skill and manpower into consideration SAN security is often treated as an orphan.
There is a huge market for IP security with firewalls, intrusion detection systems, DMZs, honeypots and hackers with hats in all colors of the rainbow. If a famous company is hacked or victim of a huge DDOS attack you probably read that in the IT news. But if a company has an internal security breach in their storage infrastructure they'll hardly let the public know about it.
What to do from SAN point of view?
There are multiple aspects and possibilities to secure a SAN. Let's take Brocade switches as an example and let's see what could happen...
1.) Management access control
From time to time I get a request for a password reset and the switch's root account is still on the default password. THAT'S. NOT. COOL! It's really unlikely, because in all current FabricOS versions the admin gets the prompt to change the passwords for all four pre-configured user accounts of the switch if it's on the defaults. But it still happens every now and then.
It's the same like for all other devices with user management in IT: Choose passwords, which are hard to guess, can't be found in a dictionary, contain non-alphanumeric characters and so on. Change passwords from time to time, like in a 90 days interval. Most switches support RADIUS and LDAP. The ipfilter command allows you to block telnet, enforcing the use of ssh. In addition for FabricOS v7.0x it's officially supported now to have a plain key-based ssh access for more than one user, too.
And don't stick with old switches from generations ago. Not only the lower linerate and the small feature set should be considered here, but security, too. If the firmware is very old, it's also based on old components like legacy versions of openssh & Co. Very concerning security holes have been fixed over the years. You can check the installed versions of these components here. And yes, it is quite easy to see the password hashes without the root user, but at least they are salted in the current firmwares.
Security is not only about passwords, it's about user roles, too. In the Brocade switches you can define user rights with high granularity, the DCFM has its "resource groups" and the Network Advisor works with "areas of responsibility". Use them to choose wisely who can do what. You don't want to have another Terry Childs case in the media and this time about your company, do you?
The only thing I miss for many SAN switches and other storage equipment is a real, robust and trustworthy accounting or audit log. I want to see what was done on the switch and by whom. Not only what they did via CLI, but via webinterfaces, management applications and shell-less CLI accesses, too. Is there no standard to have these data automatically forwarded to an internal, trusted collection server via a secured connection? Really?
You should encrypt your traffic. There are several possibilities to catch the signal without your knowledge, especially if your data leaves your controlled ground on the way to a remote DR location. For FCIP traffic you should always use encryption. Indisputable. And for plain fibre-based FC longdistance connections? You probably say "Hey, it's transparent and it's optical fibre, not electrical. You can't just dig a hole, rip the cadding of the cable and splice a second cable in." - You have no idea. Keep in mind that the data traversing the SAN is the really important and thus precious kind in your company. There are technical possibilities to do it and if there is opportunity, there could be a criminal mind using it. This perception seems to gain acceptance among the switch vendors more and more. For example Brocade's current 16G equipment is able to have encrypted ISLs for that matter. Of course all vendors sell SAN based encryption appliances or switches, too. This way not only the inter-location traffic is encrypted, but also for the data on the disk or tape. So if there would ever be the chance that some unauthorized person gets his hands on the storage, he won't be able to read the data.
3.) Fabric access control
What would be the easiest thing to work around passwords and encryption if an intruder would have physical access to a data center? (Just like a student employee, a temp worker, an intern, an external engineer... I think you get the point) He could simply spot a free port on a switch and connect a switch he brought in. Setting up a mirror port or changing the zoning to gain access to disks and doing some other nasty things is quite easy.
How to avoid that?
FICON environments for mainframe traffic always had higher security demands and we can use just the same features for open systems as well. There are security policies allowing us to control which devices are allowed to be connected to the fabric (DCC - device connection control), which switches can be part of the fabric (SCC - switch connection control) and which switches can modify the configuration (FCS - fabric configuration server). In addition the current Brocade FabricOS versions support DH-CHAP and FCAP using certificates for authentication.
If you want to utilize the features and mechanisms described above, the FabricOS Administrator's guide provides some good descriptions and procedures to begin with. Of course IBM offers technical consulting services to help you to secure your SAN properly.
So if you are concerned if the provision model your IT could be based on in the future is secure, you should be even more concerned about the security of your SAN today!
(Disclaimer: SAN switches from other vendors may have the same or similar security features, too. I just chose Brocade switches because of their prevalance within IBM's SAN customer base.)